Many chapters in Machiavelli's book "The Prince" explained how to handle newly acquired territories. What Machiavelli wrote may shed light on how Beijing handles Xinjiang and Hong Kong today. Here are extracts from the book which I find relevant.
The Prince is a book written by Niccolò di Machiavelli It was published in 1532. This is the English version that I read.
Below I extract from the book some of the material that I find relevant to today's politics in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. I do not claim that I understand the logic in all the texts below. However, the book helps me to understand the mentality and tactics of the rulers.
... when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them. ... the Romans, predicting troubles, dealt with them at once, ... war cannot be avoided, but can only be delayed to the advantage of others...
... there are three courses for those who wish to hold [a newly acquired territory]. The first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a regular payment from the state, and establishing within [the territory] a governing group which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, it tries hard to support him. Therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.
... in republics there is more energy, greater hatred, and more desire for revenge, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest. So the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe, because they are ambitious, not united, without discipline, unfaithful, brave in front of friends and cowardly before enemies... The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for staying in battle than a small amount of pay which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you.
... he need not feel uneasy about being criticised for that bad behaviour which is necessary to maintain the state, because if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed would be his ruin; while something else, which looks wrong, may bring him security and wealth.
... it would be nice to have the reputation of being generous. Nevertheless generosity exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you. [In other words, treat “generosity” as an investment.] ... anyone wishing to maintain the reputation of being generous has to keep on being more and more generous. As a result a prince thus inclined will consume all his property in such acts... a prince ... ought not to fear the reputation of being mean. [Generosity raises expectation. Don’t do it honestly, said Machiavelli.]
... every prince ought to desire to be considered kind and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this kindness. ... a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the criticism of cruelty. By making an example of a few people, he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow rebellions to arise, from which follow murders or robberies. These are likely to injure the whole people, while those killings which are commanded by the prince only affect the individual.
And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the reputation for cruelty. This is because new states are full of dangers.
... [if a prince has to choose between being loved or feared,] it is much safer to be feared than loved... The reason for this is that in general men are ungrateful, inconstant, false, cowardly, and greedy.
As long as you succeed, [the people] are yours entirely - they will offer you their blood, property, life, and children, when the need is far distant.
But above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance.
There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects. Rather, when he has found them disarmed, he has always armed them. By arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your supporters... when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely. This difference in their treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your supporters, and the latter ... excuse you.
A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or an absolute enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other.
A prince ought also be seen to support people of ability, and to honour the skilled in every art. A prince ought to amuse the people with entertainments and ceremonies at appropriate times of the year.
The choice of staff is very important to a prince, ... The first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his capability, is by observing the people he has around him.
The courts are full of [flatterers]...
The only way to guard yourself from flatterers is to
let people understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you.
However, when everyone feels free to tell you the truth, respect for you goes down.
Therefore a wise prince ought to follow a third course by choosing the wise men in his state,
and giving to them alone the liberty of speaking the truth to him...
[End]
Related:
The author studies the above topic as a scholar. The discussion above is not politically motivated. Neither is any value judgements intended.
